[Anti-Cartesianism and psychophysical relations].
20th Century philosophical Anti-Cartesianism has not succeeded in developing either a generally valid theory, or a unitary conceptual framework for such a theory. In this respect it is to be distinguished, most especially, from the legacy of Cartesian ontology. The most primary revision envisaged by the latter appears to be one which starts out from the particularity of the person's experience of his own body. The question of the possibility of such a revised ontology will be considered here from the standpoint of a contrast between the psycho-physical dualism of Classical and Modern times, with regard to their immanental pre-supposition. From a methodological point of view, this enquiry will be oriented round the multiple meanings inherent in the basic relation between things and ideas; from which it will be apparent that they can be interpreted out of more than one single ontological frame of reference.